The challenge of universal norms : securing effective defence rights across different jurisdictions and legal cultures by Hodgson, Jacqueline
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript 
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the 
published version or Version of Record. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/123893                                                        
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information.  
If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain 
details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk. 
 
Forthcoming in Journal of Law and Society (2019) 
 
 
The Challenge of Universal Norms: Securing Effective Defence Rights Across 
Different Jurisdictions and Legal Cultures 
 
JACQUELINE HODGSON* 
 
This article considers the contribution of comparative empirical research in the 
shaping of best practice norms for custodial legal advice, and in helping to address 
the challenges faced by those responsible for their implementation.  It traces the 
role of European Court of Human Rights decisions and of European Union 
Directives in developing transnational norms to strengthen suspects’ right to legal 
assistance prior to and during police questioning.  Recognising the variety of ways 
in which these norms are translated into the national context, and so their 
differential impact in practice, it considers the value of comparative empirical and 
socio-legal research in helping to develop appropriate legislative and training 
measures that take account of factors such as the intersecting roles of legal actors; 
the different ways that roles and responsibilities are shared out in different legal 
systems and traditions; and the practical arrangements in place that serve to 
facilitate or inhibit the effectiveness of custodial legal advice in practice.  In all of 
this, there is a tension between the framing of transnational norms in a way that is 
sufficiently universal to attract support, without being so broad as to lack any 
transformational force; and sufficiently detailed to ensure that core protections are 
respected in the process of implementation, without imposing a set of legal 
requirements that are too rigid and difficult to absorb into diverse processes of 
criminal justice. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Taking the example of custodial legal advice, this paper considers the 
contribution of comparative empirical research in the shaping of transnational 
best practice norms, and in understanding and helping to address the challenges 
faced by those responsible for their implementation.  It traces briefly the roles of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Union (EU) in 
developing the parameters of standards designed to strengthen suspects’ rights 
in police custody, before considering the contribution of comparative empirical 
research in helping to define and to translate legal norms into practices that are 
effective on the ground.  Comparative studies play an important part in this 
process, providing accounts of the structure and functioning of different legal 
systems.  However, where these rest on descriptive and formal accounts, 
grounded in the text rather than the practice of law, their value is limited.  I 
argue that a comparative, socio-legal empirical approach provides a deeper 
knowledge and understanding of the ways that legal systems operate, comparing 
roles and procedures, and exploring what motivates and constrains the daily 
practices of legal actors in different jurisdictions.  By learning from the 
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experiences of different jurisdictions in this way, we are better able to shape the 
development of reforms and to offer suggestions for effective implementation 
across different processes of criminal justice. 
 
The discussion draws on my own experience as a socio-legal and comparative 
researcher, conducting observational fieldwork, focus groups and interviews 
across several jurisdictions, over several decades.  England and Wales and 
France formed the initial comparative focus of my research,1 with later studies 
more explicitly oriented towards improving the procedural rights and 
protections in place for suspects across a range of jurisdictions and identifying 
the conditions under which they might be adopted elsewhere.  Two particular 
empirical studies are discussed here: Inside Police Custody and Interrogating 
Young Suspects.  These were collaborative, cross-country studies funded by the 
European Commission, designed to identify and understand best practices in 
order to inform the development of effective EU-wide procedural protections for 
adult and juvenile suspects and accused persons.2   
 
DIFFERENT WAYS OF COMPARING 
 
Conducting legal research across different jurisdictions provides useful baseline 
information for any study that aims to identify, understand or develop 
transnational best practices.  When assessing the safeguards provided for 
suspects, for example, our starting point might be whether or not different 
jurisdictions make legal provision for suspects to have access to a lawyer whilst 
in police custody.  However, a simple yes/no response is of limited value.  Going 
beyond a relatively static, multi-country collection of information, actively to 
compare the nature of provision across systems, provides a richer 
understanding.  It enables researchers to adjust the categories of enquiry in the 
light of what is known about different jurisdictions, and so gather additional 
types of information about what is absent as well as what is present.  So, we 
might compare whether the suspect is able to request their own lawyer or has 
one assigned to them; whether the law provides for consultation in private and if 
this is time limited; whether they are able to have a lawyer present during the 
police interrogation.  A comparative background, as well as approach, helps 
ensure that the right questions are asked in this process, providing a more 
detailed and nuanced picture of the law in different jurisdictions.  Comparing in 
this fashion, thinking about why certain features are present or absent in 
different systems also causes us to think about the roles that legal actors could or 
should play.  Understanding the French or Belgian prosecutor’s responsibility for 
                                                        
1 See especially, J. Hodgson French Criminal Justice: A Comparative Account of the 
Investigation and Prosecution of Crime in France (2005) 
2 J. Blackstock et. al., Inside Police Custody: An Empirical Account of Suspects’ 
Rights in Four Jurisdictions (2014); M. Vanderhallen et. al., Interrogating Young 
Suspects: Procedural Safeguards form an Empirical Perspective (2016).  In 
addition to conducting research studies, I have also been involved in a range of 
EU impact assessments of new and existing measures such as legal aid, legal 
advice, pre-trial detention and the impact of Brexit on criminal justice co-
operation. 
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the police investigation (including detaining and questioning suspects), 
highlights the absence of any external pre-trial supervisory function relating to 
the police detention and questioning of suspects in England and Wales, for 
example.  This in turn causes us to consider how far the defence role, in addition 
to representing the interests of the accused, can or should play a part in holding 
the police to account during the detention of the suspect – whether in England 
and Wales or elsewhere.   
 
However, when thinking about learning from elsewhere in the development of 
universal norms and best practices, we need to go beyond the comparison of 
legal texts and processes to understand whether and how legal norms and 
safeguards translate into the everyday practices of law and the experiences of 
suspects.  Comparative work that is also qualitative and empirical is able to 
explore the legal and occupational cultures that drive or challenge behaviour, as 
well as the impact of wider policy and economic structures within which 
criminal practice operates, and the broader legal traditions that shape 
contemporary criminal justice.3  Working in this way enables a deeper 
understanding of concepts and terms, and of the ways that they find meaning 
within different legal traditions.  This perspective is crucial in understanding 
what might enable or constrain the success of transnational norms, ensuring that 
reforms are not falsely anchored in ideal-types and misleading assumptions.  The 
effectiveness of procedural protections in practice also depends on the nature of 
other safeguards and procedures, and the ways that they intersect.  For example, 
the presence of a lawyer to advise suspects in police custody in France was for 
many years considered unnecessary, because, it was claimed, the structure of 
judicial supervision in place rendered the initial police interrogation 
unimportant.4  Empirical research has demonstrated the ineffectiveness of such 
supervision,5 and the Conseil constitutionnel has recognised the importance of 
the initial police enquiry, which in many cases represents the evidence in the 
case.6  Framing legal procedures around these kinds of claims risks leaving 
unprotected those detained and questioned as suspects.   
 
This more empirical approach to comparative study also embeds a reflexivity, or 
mirroring, into the research methodology.7  Early on in my comparative career, I 
had cause to re-evaluate the roles played by court actors in England and Wales, 
after observing French trial hearings.  In France, the judge questioned the 
                                                        
3 On the influence of empirical research in criminal justice more broadly, see J. 
Hodgson and Y. Mou, ‘Empirical Approaches to Criminal Procedure’ in The Oxford 
Handbook of Criminal Process, eds. D.K. Brown, et al. (2019). 
4 Great emphasis has been placed on the effectiveness of judicial supervision as a 
means of controlling or overseeing the police investigation, but in practice, this 
operates as a relatively weak safeguard.  See Hodgson, op. cit., n. 1. 
5 See for example, Hodgson, op. cit. n. 1. 
6 Decision No. 2010-14/22 of 30 July 2010.  See discussion in 
https://blogs.warwick.ac.uk/jackiehodgson/entry/reforming_the_french/  
7 See R. Rogowski, ‘The Art of Mirroring. Comparative Law and Social Theory’, in 
Challenges to European Legal Scholarship – Anglo-German Essays, eds. G. Wilson 
and R. Rogowski (1996) 213. 
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accused directly, asking whether she understood, and inviting her to comment 
on the charges and the evidence of any witnesses, even where the accused had 
made a clear admission.  This dialogue with the defendant and the concern to 
understand her motivation in offending, were in stark contrast to the courtroom 
process in England and Wales.  Defendants pleading guilty in the magistrates’ 
court said almost nothing beyond identifying themselves and acknowledging the 
charges.  Any attempt to speak was silenced and the defence lawyer implored to 
‘manage’ her client.  Although the verdict was that of the court, it depended 
entirely on the work of the defence lawyer.  The magistrates made no effort to 
ensure the accused understood the charges, nor that any admission was made in 
a voluntary and informed way.  The idea that a guilty plea represented a finding 
of the court, now seemed to me somewhat artificial.  To a large extent, the 
defence lawyer was relied upon to carry out the work done by judicial 
questioning in France.  This illustrates the very different ways that jurisdictions 
characterise and understand the judicial role in practice, reflecting legal cultural 
norms that may not be apparent from the study of a single jurisdiction or the text 
of the law alone.  A comparative understanding of these kinds of practices can 
also be important when thinking about the likely effectiveness of transnational 
norms once they are enacted and adopted within different procedural traditions. 
 
 
THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPING UNIVERSAL FAIR TRIAL NORMS 
 
In the development of transnational legal norms, there is a difficult balance to be 
struck between something that is sufficiently broad and open textured to attract 
the support of a variety of jurisdictions, whilst also sufficiently detailed to ensure 
consistent and effective implementation in practice.  Universality tends towards 
broadly defined standards that can be applied flexibly through interpretive 
techniques such as the ECtHR’s margin of appreciation doctrine; effectiveness 
tends towards more prescriptive norms but which also take account of how 
things work on the ground, of the drivers and constraints that work to promote 
or to undermine the wider objectives of legal norms.  Europe is made up of a 
wide variety of legal traditions and cultures and there is not a one size fits all 
model of criminal justice and procedure.  The more detailed the transnational 
legal normative framework, therefore, the harder it is to ensure a good fit across 
large numbers of legal systems and the greater the risk that some jurisdictions 
will experience it as the imposition of a model that is alien to their legal norms, 
cultures and practices and so resist its implementation.  A more general and less 
detailed framework, however, that sets a broadly defined benchmark, is unlikely 
to achieve standards that are comparable across jurisdictions.  Instead, it will be 
implemented in ways that reflect more strongly the values and norms of 
individual states, risking the dilution of core elements of the legal norm and so 
the rights and safeguards it is designed to protect. 
 
This tension between a broader more abstract approach and more detailed 
prescription characterises to some extent the differences between the approach 
of the ECtHR and its broad requirements of fair trial under Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the EU’s more detailed and 
prescriptive norms around procedural safeguards for suspects and accused 
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persons.  It also reflects the nature of the different tasks facing the two 
institutions – one a court developing broad principles for transnational 
application through interpreting and applying legal standards in individual 
cases, and the other a legislative structure with its own political reform agenda 
around the strengthening of mutual trust between states to facilitate greater 
criminal justice co-operation.  As a court, the ECtHR is responsive, rather than 
proactive; it does not control the nature of the cases that come before it.  It does 
not select the issues it wishes to develop, but rather, its jurisprudence derives 
from decisions about the specific legal arrangements and practices of individual 
states, and whether they comply with the ECHR, or whether the applicant has not 
received a fair trial because of the state’s failings either in a particular case, or 
systemically.  The principles that can then be taken forward and applied in 
subsequent cases and across other states, are expressed in necessarily broad 
terms, in order to allow for the different ways in which criminal procedures are 
organised. 
 
The EU, on the other hand, acts on its own social and political agenda, legislates 
measures through its own institutions (themselves made up of representatives 
from all Member States) and is able to craft them to suit the needs of those 
Member States to some extent.  The various processes that precede and feed into 
legislation – such as research, negotiation and the conduct of impact assessments 
– are able to anticipate some of the pitfalls of implementation and so, although 
detailed and prescriptive, the resulting measures are likely to have greater buy 
in from states.  However, whether emanating from the EU or the ECtHR, the 
success of these norms in effecting change, also depends on the will of those 
responsible for their implementation both through legislation and on the ground.  
The different ways that this might happen are well illustrated by the example of 
custodial legal advice.   
 
In recent years minimum standards have been set both by the ECtHR and the EU 
in relation to procedural safeguards for suspects in police custody.  First, we 
have seen reinterpretation by the ECtHR of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 
§3(c) ECHR so as to include the right of suspects questioned in police custody to 
legal advice and assistance.  Subsequently the EU has sought to use first 
Framework Decisions and then Directives to set minimum standards of 
procedural protections for suspects and accused persons.  The aspiration in both 
cases has been to “guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights 
that are practical and effective.” 8  State willingness to implement these rights has 
varied but one of the variables has been the origin of the legally prescribed 
norms.  EU Directives seem to have had some significant advantages over ECtHR 
case-law in effectively establishing transitional prescriptions. 
 
Recognising the need for procedural protections for suspects, including access to 
legal assistance, the EU published a Green Paper in 2003, later followed by a 
                                                        
8 Imbrioscia v. Switzerland 24 November 1993, Series A no. 275, para 36.  Also EU 
Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings, 
Art. 3 para 1. 
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draft Framework Decision in 2004.9  Minimum standards for the protection of 
accused persons were considered necessary in order to counterbalance the 
various police and judicial co-operation measures focusing on investigation and 
prosecution, and the European Arrest Warrant in particular. The Framework 
Decision did not seek “to duplicate what is in the ECHR but rather to promote 
compliance at a consistent standard.”10  It included the suspect’s right to be 
informed of her rights, to an interpreter, to consular assistance, and what turned 
out to be the most controversial of all the measures, her right to legal advice and 
assistance.  Although based on Article 6 ECHR guarantees, and so reflecting a 
more precisely articulated account of existing obligations, the measure met with 
considerable opposition and was finally abandoned when agreement on the right 
to custodial legal advice could not be reached.  European states were not ready 
to agree on detailed provisions that would bind them into common standards of 
protection, especially concerning suspects’ access to a lawyer. 
 
Then came the landmark ECtHR case of Salduz v. Turkey in 2008, which set out 
the right to custodial legal advice deriving from Article 6 ECHR: without access to 
legal advice prior to and during police interrogation, an admission obtained 
under police questioning would not be admissible.11  This set the bar higher than 
previously and for the first time, required suspects to have their lawyer present 
during questioning, from the first police interrogation.12  It also signalled a 
different approach from the Court in respect of the right to a lawyer during 
police custody and interrogation.  There was less room for the margin of 
appreciation, through which, taking account of the differences between states’ 
legal traditions, different ways of achieving the same level of protection are 
understood to comply with ECHR standards.  Neither was custodial legal advice 
weighed up with other protections to determine whether, overall, there had been 
a fair trial as had been the Court’s practice.  In other words, subsequent 
safeguards would not remedy the initial breach.  The court recognised that the 
suspect is especially vulnerable in the early stages of the investigation, 
particularly where national courts attach consequences to the attitude of the 
suspect – to answer questions, or to remain silent, for example – and the 
                                                        
9 The Green Paper was entitled Procedural Safeguards for Suspects and 
Defendants in Criminal Proceedings Throughout the European Union Brussels, 
19.2.2003, COM(2003) 75f, followed in 2004 by the draft Council Framework 
Decision on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings throughout the 
European Union. 
10 Draft Council Framework Decision, COM (2004) 328 final, Explanatory 
Memorandum, para. 9.  Note that the EU legislative framework was different at 
this time.  Framework Decisions have been dropped and Directives are now used 
for criminal measures. 
11 Salduz v. Turkey (36391/02) 27 November 2008. 
12 Although recognising the right to consult a lawyer before police interrogation 
(Averill v. United Kingdom (36408/97) 6 June 2000) and the necessary 
counterbalance to police pressure during questioning that a lawyer might 
provide (Magee v. United Kingdom (28135/95) 6 June 2000), before Salduz, the 
Court had not interpreted Article 6 ECHR to include the right to have a lawyer 
present during police interrogation. 
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evidence obtained often determines the charges brought and frames the nature 
of the trial.  The damage done by questioning a suspect without a lawyer and 
gaining an admission could not be undone, therefore, by providing a lawyer, or 
any other safeguard, later in the process.  The right to a lawyer during police 
questioning was considered by the Court to be fundamental to the right to a fair 
trial: “The rights of the defence will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when 
incriminating statements made during police interrogation without access to a 
lawyer are used for a conviction.”13 
 
Here was a clearly spelled out and reasoned transnational norm, building on 
existing jurisprudence around suspects’ right to legal assistance.  However, many 
countries chose not to consider themselves bound by the decision, finding 
reasons to distinguish it from their own procedure.14  It was addressed to Turkey 
not them; it concerned a juvenile not an adult; it was a terrorism investigation, 
not an ordinary criminal investigation.  Jurisdictions found ways to disregard or 
undermine the decision, and in many instances, change was only brought about 
as a result of litigating the issue in the ordinary and constitutional courts.  
Understanding the nature of jurisdictions’ resistance and the variety of ways in 
which countries understood themselves to be compliant with the principles set 
out in Salduz tells us much about how we might learn from the expectations of 
different systems and how we might fashion such norms in ways that are more 
likely to be effective in practice.   
 
In Scotland, for example, the High Court of Judiciary ruled that the existing 
arrangements limiting the access to a lawyer to pre-interrogation advice were 
Salduz compliant, given the other safeguards in place.  It was only following the 
Supreme Court decision Cadder that presence during police questioning was 
permitted.15  In France, prior to Salduz, suspects were not permitted to have 
their lawyer present during police questioning and the lawyer-client 
consultation was limited to 30 minutes.  While Salduz resulted in the lawyer 
                                                        
13 Salduz, op. cit., n. 11, para 55. 
14 It is interesting to compare here the US case of Miranda v. Arizona 384 US 346 
(1966) in which the US Supreme Court held that statements made by the suspect 
under police questioning were only admissible if the accused had been provided 
with access to a lawyer before and during police interrogation, had been told of 
their right to silence and understood these rights.  Any waiver must be shown to 
be voluntary.  Myers has argued that the institutional limitations to enforcing 
this right are due in part to its origin as a Supreme Court decision.  First, courts 
are better at defining and enforcing negative rights, rather than positive ones.  
Second, courts are more suited to enforcing process than accuracy, so as their 
concern with accuracy increases they impose more process requirements.  And 
finally, courts do not have budgets or enforcement powers, limiting their ability 
to police the effectiveness of the right to counsel in practice.  See discussion in R. 
Myers, ‘Adversarial Counsel in an Inquisitorial System’ (2011) 37 North Carolina 
J. of International Law and Commercial Regulation 411 
15 Cadder v. Her Majesty’s Advocate [2010] UKSC 43.  Lord Hope commented that 
it was “remarkable that, until quite recently, nobody thought that there was 
anything wrong with this procedure.” id., para. 4. 
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being permitted to be present during interrogation, she was required simply to 
observe, unable to assist the suspect in any way.16  In the Netherlands, making 
provision of custodial legal advice was a more radical step, as there was not 
statutory right for those detained either to speak with a lawyer, or to have a 
lawyer present during police questioning.  Salduz prompted a reform that 
allowed suspects a 30-minute consultation with a lawyer, but only juvenile 
suspects, not adults, were permitted to have their lawyer present during 
questioning.17  This unevenness in when and how the suspect could access legal 
assistance undermines the fair trial protections of Article 6 ECHR that apply to 
all states in the Council of Europe.18  States enact the minimum degree of change 
they consider necessary to ensure compliance, often believing that the 
safeguards and procedures they have in place mitigate the need for anything 
more.  In this way, local legal cultures are preserved and transnational 
safeguards are sidelined.  A stronger pre-trial defence role is associated with 
more adversarial procedure and so we might expect more inquisitorial traditions 
to resist the presence of the lawyer more strongly than their adversarial 
counterparts, but the story of these reforms shows that this appears not to be the 
case.  Rather, we see a more general antipathy towards strengthening the rights 
of the accused, reflecting a broader, more universal crime control ideology 
shared by police and prosecutors.19    
 
The EU returned to the matter of procedural protections for suspects and 
accused persons, but this time a different approach was taken in the 2009 
Roadmap adopted by the Council.  Instead of placing all safeguards in a single 
measure so that they would stand or fall together, a step-by-step approach was 
taken, separating out the various rights and protections to be agreed upon 
individually.20  The importance of the safeguards in the overall framework of EU 
criminal justice co-operation, and as an integral part of the mutual trust and 
recognition that underpins this, was emphasised, as was the interlinking nature 
                                                        
16 Previously, suspects could consult with a lawyer prior to police questioning, 
but could not have her present during interrogation.  Neither were suspects 
informed of their right to silence.  See further, J. Hodgson, ‘The detention and 
interrogation of suspects detained in police custody in France: a comparative 
account’ (2004) 1 European Journal of Criminology 163. 
17 The process of reform was initiated prior to Salduz, with a pilot study allowing 
lawyers to be present in serious criminal cases.  See J. Blackstock et al., op. cit., n. 
2, p. 99. 
18 See also D. Giannoulopoulos, ‘Strasbourg Jurisprudence, Law Reform and 
Comparative Law: A Tale of the Right to Custodial Legal Advice in Five Countries’ 
(2006) 16 (1) Human Rights Law Review 10 
19 There is already some concern that the ECtHR has rowed back from the more 
robust terms of Salduz, finding ‘compelling reasons’ that justified restricting 
access to legal assistance.  See Ibrahim and others v UK, 50541/08, 50571/08, 
50573/08, 40351/09, 13 September 2016; Simeonovi v Bulgaria, 21980/04, 12 
May 2017. 
20 For discussion of the wider context of these early measures and the Roadmap, 
see, J. Hodgson, ‘Safeguarding Suspects' Rights in Europe: A Comparative 
Perspective’ (2011) 14 New Criminal Law Rev. 611. 
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of the measures.  The decision in Salduz served as a positive backdrop against 
which to consider these new measures, but it was recognised that this alone 
would not produce sufficient or consistent levels of protection for suspects.  The 
right to interpretation and translation was relatively uncontroversial and was 
the first Roadmap measure to be formally adopted as an EU Directive, in 2010.  
The right to information in criminal proceedings followed in 2012 and the 
Directive on the right of access to a lawyer was finally adopted in October 2013, 
more than two years after it was first adopted in draft form and requiring eight 
trilogues before its formal adoption.21  As an EU Directive, the measure was more 
detailed and more prescriptive than the terms of the ECtHR decisions in Salduz 
and subsequent case law, setting out when advice should be available, that it 
should enable the practical and effective exercise of defence rights, may only be 
derogated from exceptionally and more specifically, that suspects should be able 
to consult privately with their lawyer and have them present and able to 
participate in police questioning.22  And unlike the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, 
there is no margin of appreciation: the measure aims to harmonise the laws of 
Member States in order to achieve universal and consistent standards.23  The 
response of states to the Salduz decision was also instructive in anticipating 
aspects of the safeguard that may be unclear, or on which states may need clear 
guidance.  Comparative research provided important insights and an evidence 
base for the Directive’s impact assessment, as well as informing the debate 
around the provision of custodial legal advice, and research continues to be a 
means of monitoring the effectiveness of implementation in practice. 
 
COMPARATIVE RESEARCH AND TRANSNATIONAL NORMS 
 
As European jurisdictions were developing greater pre-trial defence rights, 
spurred on by the Salduz jurisprudence, and the EU was embarking on its 
programme of reform through the Roadmap, the European Commission funded a 
range of projects around police and judicial co-operation, designed to provide a 
richer understanding of processes of criminal justice and to ensure the 
effectiveness of the planned reforms.  This included the four-country study that 
resulted in Inside Police Custody.  Earlier empirical research into the introduction 
of a statutory right to custodial legal advice in England and Wales under section 
58 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 had demonstrated that there 
were a range of other changes that needed to happen in order to ensure that the 
right was effective in practice – that suspects were able to request and receive 
legal assistance and that legal advice was provided by suitably qualified and 
                                                        
21 As expected, given the history of the draft framework decision, it was the right 
to legal assistance that posed the greatest challenge to Member States’ legal 
procedures and the balance of protections and this is why so many discussion 
sessions were required. 
22 Op. cit., n. 8. 
23 The Directives are cumulative and interdependent.  The right to a lawyer is of 
little use without some information on the charges, for example, or an 
interpreter if the suspect does not speak or understand the language of the 
criminal proceedings. 
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experienced lawyers.24  Building on this and other research,25 this empirical 
observational study sought to understand pre-trial safeguards from the 
perspectives of the two principal legal actors responsible for their successful 
implementation – police and lawyers.   Focusing on the key safeguards that the 
EU was seeking to legislate through the Roadmap, our researchers carried out 
fieldwork in England and Wales, France, the Netherlands and Scotland over a 
total of 78 weeks, collecting case file data and observing police and lawyers as 
they went about their daily work in police custody.26  In addition to the final 
publication, at the Commission’s request we prepared an advance report on our 
preliminary findings in order to inform the final stages of discussion and 
negotiation for the Directive on legal assistance.  In this way, the research was 
able to feed directly in to the latter stages of the legislative process.  
Interrogating Young Suspects came about in the same way.  This was a five-
country study, which collected data from closed files and conducted focus group 
interviews with police, lawyers, appropriate adults and young people who had 
experience as suspects.27  The jurisdictions studied were Belgium, England and 
Wales, Italy, the Netherlands and Poland.  Both projects were collaborations 
across several jurisdictions and included legal comparativists, researchers and 
practitioners from different countries.  The socio-legal, empirical and 
comparative nature of the projects sought to avoid accounts based solely on the 
text and rhetoric of law, or on ethnocentric understandings of procedures.   
 
In both research studies, the breadth of the team’s background and experience 
embedded a reflexive comparative structure into the projects from the outset as 
legal processes, actors and functions were reflected on and unpicked in the 
initial design of the proposal and the later process of cross-jurisdictional 
analysis.  By adopting a thematic or transversal approach, team members 
worked across all jurisdictions, focusing on particular topics rather than 
jurisdictions.  For example, how the suspect’s treatment on arrest affected her 
behaviour and treatment in custody; the importance of offence gravity; whether 
the police saw the young person primarily as a child or as a suspect; or the role 
of the lawyer.  This approach also brought benefits in the early stages of the 
projects, feeding back into the process of generating our research questions and 
whether we had a sufficiently precise common language to identify transnational 
norms and good practices.  Our understandings of terms such as child, charge, 
judge or prosecution were not the same.   
                                                        
24 See A. Sanders et al., Advice and Assistance at Police Stations and the 24-hour 
Duty Solicitor Scheme (1989); M. McConville and J. Hodgson, Custodial Legal 
Advice and the Right to Silence (1993); M. McConville et al., Standing Accused 
(1994).  Also, M. McConville et al., Case for the Prosecution (1991). 
25 Re France see Hodgson, op. cit., n.1.  Also S. Field and A. West,  ‘Dialogue and 
the Inquisitorial Tradition: French Defence Lawyers in the Pre-Trial Criminal 
Process’ (2003) 14 Criminal Law Forum 261. 
26 Data was collected on 368 cases and at the close of observations, 94 interviews 
were conducted. 44 interviews were with police and 50 with lawyers.  See 
Vanderhallen and Hodgson in Vanderhallen et al., op. cit., n. 2, ch. 2 for a 
discussion of the project methodology.   
27 id. 
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This reflexivity, as a process of comparing understandings of terms and 
descriptors, provided important insights into the workings of legal systems and 
the effectiveness of safeguards and procedures.  For example, the Dutch 
prosecutor provides some independent oversight of police detention, but our 
understanding of the value of this altered when we learned from the Inside Police 
Custody fieldwork that the ‘assistant prosecutor’, despite her title, is not part of 
the professional prosecution service, but a senior police officer.  As well as 
clarifying the nature of the role, this underlined for us the importance of 
ensuring that the lawyer played an effective and independent role, despite claims 
of prosecutorial oversight.  Seeing things through the eyes of others also caused 
us to re-examine and question some of the assumptions we had of our own legal 
systems.  In England and Wales, for example, we often think of the extensive 
opportunities for the suspect to consult with her lawyer and to have her present 
throughout the police detention and interrogation as a strength within the 
adversarial tradition.  But to the outside observer, the detention and 
interrogation of suspects remains a broadly inquisitorial process, as the accused 
has no right to participate in or influence the investigation, has little statutory 
right to information about the evidence and the police are not accountable to, or 
overseen by, any form of judicial figure during this period.   
 
There were also interesting differences in approach observed in Interrogating 
Young Suspects.  In Poland, the treatment of young people was generally under 
the jurisdiction of the family judge, rather than the criminal law regime, 
reflecting a welfare model of juvenile care that relied more on the attributes of 
the individual as a judge, than a more process-driven system of legal procedural 
safeguards.  At first, this seemed a benevolent model that sought to avoid the 
criminalisation of children and young people.  However, although characterised 
in paternalistic terms, this welfare model carried many of the hallmarks of a 
penal process and was experienced as such by young suspects.  Much was left to 
the individual discretion of the judge, police questioning was employed and 
criminal-type sanctions were imposed, but without the due process safeguards 
of criminal process, such as legal representation, leaving young people in a worse 
position than if they had faced criminal charges.28  Looking at the process from 
the perspective of the protection of the young person, we challenged the 
welfarist claims of this approach: when thinking comparatively about functions 
and guarantees, it is the characteristics of the process and function that are more 
significant than the labels attached to them.  
 
When drawing on best practices to inform the development of transnational 
standards for the protection of the accused, we naturally turn to the role of the 
defence lawyer.  Charged with representing the interests of accused persons and 
suspects, she is a key player.  However, the picture is more complex and 
universal standards and practices are hard to agree on.  The role of the defence is 
not understood in the same way across jurisdictions because the roles of other 
legal actors, such as prosecutors and judges, intersect differently with that of the 
defence lawyer.  In the party-centred adversarial tradition of criminal procedure 
                                                        
28 Vanderhallen et. al., op. cit., n. 2, ch. 7 
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in England and Wales, safeguarding the rights of the accused is understood to be 
the responsibility of the defence lawyer.  French criminal procedure reflects a 
very different, more centrally organised investigation model, in which a judicial 
officer (the prosecutor or the juge d’instruction) is responsible for guaranteeing 
the rights and liberties of the individual, but also for the conduct of the enquiry, 
ensuring the investigation of evidence that both inculpates and exculpates the 
suspect.  The defence has historically enjoyed a more limited function, because 
aspects of the defence lawyer’s role in England and Wales were understood in 
France to fall within the responsibility of the judicial officer in charge of the case.  
Because of the protections assumed to be provided by this model of judicially 
supervised investigations, before Salduz, the role of the defence lawyer in France 
had been restricted to pre-interrogation advice and even this was widely and 
fiercely opposed when first introduced.29  The lawyer is now permitted to be 
present during the suspect’s interrogation, but responsibility for overseeing the 
conduct of the investigation remains with the prosecutor and the lawyer’s role is 
understood and designed to complement more than challenge this structure of 
authority.30  This means that the lawyer’s role is constrained in different ways in 
France, compared with England and Wales, or Scotland. 
 
The varying expectations of different legal traditions explain in part the nature of 
the resistance to legal norms, such as those that seek to strengthen the defence 
role, but comparative research has shown that the responses of criminal justice 
actors are not always grounded in particular criminal justice models or practices.  
Across different procedural traditions, criminal justice is regarded in binary, 
mutually exclusive terms, dividing into investigation and prosecution on one 
side, and defence on the other; into crime control and due process.  Police culture 
dictates that officers are at best cautious towards the expanding role of the 
lawyer during police custody and in many instances, see the defence function as 
antithetical to the effectiveness of the investigation, the rights of victims and of 
achieving justice.  In neither the adversarial nor inquisitorial-type jurisdictions 
do officers buy into the idea that the defence might help to ensure the fairness of 
the process or the reliability of the evidence, nor that the defence case might play 
an important role in establishing the truth. 31  This lack of belief in the value and 
legitimacy of defence participation at the investigative stage means that in both 
adversarial or inquisitorial type procedures, the police are likely, initially, to 
resist any expansion of the lawyer’s role, and, consciously or unconsciously, to 
engage in rights avoidance strategies that seek to ensure that suspects do not 
take up their right to legal assistance.   
 
                                                        
29 For a discussion of the development of these early reforms see Hodgson, op. 
cit., n. 1, pp. 131-41. 
30 See also Field and West, op. cit., n. 25. 
31 As one police officer put it: “It’s obstructing justice and that’s fine if that’s what 
they want to do but I do have a philosophical problem with defence solicitors 
because I think they mostly know that about 80% of people that get arrested are 
guilty.  They get a lot of them off and I don’t think it’s an honourable profession 
at all.”  Blackstock et. al., op. cit., n. 2, pp. 345-6. 
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In France (in the 1990s) and the Netherlands (following Salduz and with the 
prospect of the Directive making provision for access to a lawyer), the nature of 
the police resistance to custodial legal advice was identical to that observed in 
police stations in England and Wales in the 1980s and 1990s.  Officers sought to 
dissuade suspects from exercising their right to custodial legal advice by 
omitting to tell suspects that there was no charge to instruct a lawyer; by telling 
suspects that if they had nothing to hide, they would not need a lawyer; and most 
successful of all, by claiming that a lawyer would delay things considerably and 
result in the suspect spending longer in police custody.32  Following Salduz, it 
was unsurprising, therefore, that proposals to strengthen the right to custodial 
legal advice by allowing the lawyer to be present during the police interrogation 
of the suspect would not be well received.  In Belgium, police officers seemed to 
attach little importance to the mandatory requirement that juvenile suspects be 
represented by a lawyer.  They were often questioned by the police without a 
lawyer present, sometimes because there may not have been a lawyer 
immediately available, but also because many officers were unaware that legal 
assistance is mandatory for juveniles – this was not a norm that they were 
motivated to implement.33   
 
When first confronted with the prospect of lawyers coming into the police 
station and advising suspects, officers in France, England and Wales and the 
Netherlands also characterised the lawyer’s role in similar terms – they 
described them as not being of any real value, of benefitting suspects over 
victims and of undermining criminal investigations.  Officers recognised that the 
main benefit, especially in more serious cases, was in providing legitimacy to the 
investigative process and so protecting it from later challenge.  In systems where 
investigative responsibility is shared between police and prosecutors, 
prosecutors have tended also to identify strongly with police ideologies and 
resist the expansion of the lawyer’s role for the same kinds of reasons as 
officers.34  It is when due process reforms are first introduced that they are 
experienced as most threatening and disruptive; once police and prosecutors 
become accustomed to the lawyer’s role, however, and see that it has less impact 
on the investigative process than they feared, this hostility fades.35  It is perhaps 
                                                        
32 Blackstock et. al., op. cit., n. 2, ch. 6.  For earlier research on custodial legal 
advice in England and Wales, including the rights avoiding practices of police, see 
McConville and Hodgson, op. cit., n. 24.  Release from police custody is the 
primary concern of most suspects.  See also L. Skinns ‘'I'm a Detainee Get Me out 
of Here' Predictors of Access to Custodial Legal Advice in Public and Privatized 
Police Custody Areas in England and Wales’ (2009) 49 Brit. J. of Criminology 399. 
33 Vanderhallen et. al., op. cit., n. 2, p. 336. 
34 So concerned were French prosecutors that lawyers would be able to see their 
client for 30 minutes, 20 hours after the suspect had been placed in detention, 
that a number of them burned their codes of criminal procedure outside the 
Ministry of Justice in protest.  See generally, Hodgson, op. cit. n. 1, pp131-41.   
35 The presence of the lawyer will help to ensure that safeguards and fair 
practices are respected, as well as providing an opportunity to construct the 
defence.  However, fears that it would restrict the investigation, primarily 
through suspects remaining silent, have proved ill-founded. 
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for this reason that Scottish police did not exhibit the same degree of hostility: 
Scottish lawyers almost always provided only telephone advice and so had little 
impact on the interrogation.36   
 
In order to be effective, reforms around custodial legal advice also need to take 
account of the nature and motivations of police practices so that officers buy in 
to the importance of safeguards and are prevented from engaging in systematic 
rights avoidance behaviours.  Legislative reform alone is unlikely to succeed in 
this.  Legal guidelines and codes of practice can make clearer the detailed 
implementation of norms as they should operate at the national level, but 
training is likely to be more effective in changing attitudes and behaviours.  As 
part of the Inside Police Custody project, we produced a training framework and 
piloted the joint training of police and lawyers, in order to bring the insights 
from research to bear on the daily practices of both sets of professionals.37 In this 
way, they were able to explore what implementation of procedural rights meant 
in practice and how they could best facilitate this.  Research has demonstrated 
the resistance to reform that follows even domestically-driven changes.  An 
understanding of the purpose of rights and the development of skills to enable 
police and lawyers to deliver and facilitate them is therefore especially 
important in the context of transnational reforms, where changes may present 
greater challenges to existing practices and attitudes. 
 
Understanding and shaping lawyers’ behaviour is more complex, as they do not 
occupy the same professional space in all jurisdictions.  Here too, training has 
proved valuable in demonstrating the practical skills required to make rights 
effective.  As the accused’s representative, we might expect the lawyer’s ideology 
to be strongly oriented towards acting in the interests of her client, yet even in 
the more party-centred adversarial tradition of England and Wales, research 
revealed the dominance of a professional culture that often subordinated the 
interests of the client to wider managerial pressures or profit motives.38 PACE 
provided the suspect with a statutory right to legal assistance before and during 
police interrogation, free at the point of delivery, but in practice, lawyers failed to 
provide effective legal assistance.  Police station advice is very different from the 
kinds of work in which lawyers had traditionally been involved, be it conducting 
legal research, courtroom advocacy or taking proofs of evidence in the firm’s 
offices.  Representing suspects in police custody is a 24-hour service, on police 
territory, requiring lawyers to react quickly, often with little information on 
which to base advice.  This can be experienced as a hostile environment in 
contrast to the more formal and familiar rituals of court and requires lawyers to 
                                                        
36 Scottish lawyers told us that they always advise silence and this could be done 
just as easily over the telephone. Blackstock et. al., op. cit., n.2, pp. 287-90. 
37 J. Blackstock et. al., Inside Police Custody: Training Framework on the Provisions 
of Suspects’ Rights (2014). 
38 McConville et. al., op. cit., n. 24.  We may have more sympathy with lawyers’ 
behaviour being governed by costs in the current climate of austerity, but at the 
time of Standing Accused, legal aid rates were at their peak, but still lawyers 
downgraded criminal work in ways that maximized their profit, whilst leaving 
the client poorly served. 
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conceive of their role in a different way and to develop new skills in order to 
represent detainees as well as defendants.  However, lawyers were unwilling to 
adapt, preferring to outsource much of their police station work to junior or 
unqualified staff.  This was addressed not by further legal regulation, but through 
innovative news ways of training and a system of accreditation linked to the 
system of public financing of legal aid, which improved significantly the quality 
of custodial legal advice provided by solicitors and their representatives.39  
 
In France, a more traditional conception of the autonomous legal profession still 
prevails.  Lawyers’ work is more generalised than in England and Wales, where 
lawyers will typically practice in a single area of law, such as crime.40  This make 
it less surprising that suspects may be attended by an avocat who practises 
criminal law, or one who works in family or civil litigation.41  Like England and 
Wales, the profession is self-regulating and takes responsibility for its own 
standards of training, but the culture of the profession and its much smaller 
dependence on legal aid, make it unlikely that it would agree to delegation to 
paralegals, or to linking training and quality standards with the provision of legal 
aid payments.  This may limit the ability of lawyers to meet the demand of 
custodial legal advice moving forward. 
 
In jurisdictions such as France and the Netherlands, the defence advocate 
occupies a different professional and legal space from her counterparts in 
England and Wales.  Historically, the pre-trial role of the lawyer has been 
subordinate to that of the prosecutor and judge, even as it has gradually 
expanded.  This subordinate relationship is still felt in the greater control that 
police and prosecutors have over the lawyer’s access to her client and the limited 
extent to which she can engage actively in defence building during the crucial 
initial stages of the investigation while the suspect is being detained and 
questioned in police custody.42  In contrast to the narrow ways in which lawyers 
in England and Wales chose to interpret their role in providing custodial legal 
advice in the 1980s, French lawyers have recognised the limited scope of the role 
that is afforded them by the law and the resulting risk that the provision of 
minimal defence rights to suspects in police custody serves more to legitimate 
the investigation than to safeguard the rights of accused persons.  The right for 
lawyers in France to be present during police interrogations was hard fought and 
lawyers continue to push back against their limited role, which requires them to 
                                                        
39 L. Bridges and S. Choongh, Improving Police Station Legal Advice: The Impact of 
the Accreditation Scheme for Police Station Legal Advisers (1998). 
40 See L. Karpik French Lawyers: A Study in Collective Action 1274 to 1994 (1999); 
Field and West, op. cit., n.25, and discussion in J. Hodgson, op. cit., n.1, pp114-6. 
41 Blackstock et al., op. cit., n. 2, pp265-7. 
42 This is despite France’s apparent commitment to the principle of 
contradictoire (the requirement that the accused should have the opportunity to 
know of, and to respond to, the accusations against her – not only at trial, but 
also during the investigation, bail hearings etc. – also incorporating the notion of 
equality of arms) and the constitutional court’s acknowledgement that the 
evidence gathered during police detention and questioning is often 
determinative of the case outcome.  Op. cit., n. 6. 
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remain passive, not interrupt questioning and to only ask questions at the end of 
the interrogation.  Some hoped that this would lead to the introduction of the 
principle of contradictoire during the investigation phase,43 but this has been 
rejected.44  French lawyers strive for a greater role during this early phase of 
investigation, but are legally circumscribed in what they are permitted to do.   
 
Lawyers in England and Wales were slow to develop their custodial function in 
professional terms, but a combination of training and self-regulation linked to 
the structure of remuneration led to real improvements.  Now, the barriers to 
more effective legal assistance for suspects are inadequate evidence disclosure 
and the financial constraints imposed through fixed fee payments that 
incentivise lawyers to spend less time attending suspects in police custody.  
There is a danger here of appearing to satisfy fundamental rights and safeguards.  
The introduction of a weak right to legal assistance can place suspects in a worse 
position than if they had no lawyer at all, as they are credited with a benefit that 
they never had, making subsequent challenge of any irregularities more difficult, 
as was apparent in some of the early appeal decisions following PACE, in which 
courts refused to exclude evidence obtained through oppressive questioning 
because a lawyer had been present.45 
 
The early experiences in England and Wales underline the challenge that the 
introduction of the right to custodial legal advice can pose for lawyers, as well as 
police.  Professionals need to prepare for these new demands and roles, and to 
adjust their expectations so that they work to give effect to, rather than 
undermine, reforms.  Although almost always in favour of extended rights for 
suspects and accused persons, lawyers may not immediately appreciate the 
importance of the role that they play in police custody – providing legal advice, 
but also ensuring the legality of detention, the conditions of custody, that the 
suspect understands her rights and how to exercise them, and so on.  Or, they 
may not anticipate the shift in work patterns that 24-hour availability requires 
and so be ill-prepared to meet increased demand.  As police station advice has 
been introduced across jurisdictions, the high demand that 24-hour availability 
places on lawyers has resulted in different responses.   
 
In England and Wales, many solicitors delegated police station advice work to 
clerks paid well below legal aid rates, enabling solicitors to avoid going to police 
stations at night but also making them a considerable profit, whilst suspects 
were poorly served and often received nothing that might properly be termed 
legal assistance.  In France and the Netherlands, the criminal bar is not large and 
                                                        
43 See e.g. A. Dorange and S. Field, ‘Reforming defence rights in French police 
custody: a coming together in Europe?’ 16 International J. of Evidence and Proof 
153. 
44 See, e.g. J. Beaume (2014) Rapport sur la procédure pénale at pp. 59, 70. 
45 The most infamous example is perhaps Paris, Abdullahi and Miller [1993] 97 
Cr. App. Rep. 99.  The lack of information disclosure makes some lawyers 
skeptical about the value of custodial legal advice, especially in serious cases, 
where the suspect will be questioned by the juge d’instruction, with full access to 
the dossier of evidence at that point. 
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lawyers have responded to the demands of attending suspects in police custody 
by widening the pool of duty lawyers available to suspects, through the inclusion 
of inexperienced, newly qualified, or non-criminal law practitioners.  The 
arrangements put in place depend to an extent on the culture of the local Bar, 
with some providing extensive training and attempting to match cases with 
expertise in juvenile work or European Arrest Warrants, for example.  For many 
lawyers, the opportunity to advise suspects in police custody presented an 
opportunity to boost their income.  The presence of a lawyer, even a civil or 
family law practitioner, may provide a basic safeguard against ill-treatment, 
someone who can explain basic rights, and a check on the conduct of the 
interrogation and the accuracy of the record, but a non-criminal lawyer can 
provide only limited assistance in checking the legality of the arrest and 
detention, beginning work on the defence case, or making representations 
around bail and alternative forms of case disposal.46  Furthermore, 
discontinuous representation is the norm.  Police station advice is regarded as a 
stand-alone task, something that the profession must provide but with no 
expectation that the suspect will continue to instruct the same firm.  This 
arrangement reflects a passive model of defence assistance that does not seek 
actively to engage with the accused’s case in the ways anticipated by ECtHR case 
law or the EU Directive.   
 
The Directive itself, however, does leave room for a range of practices in the 
delivery of custodial legal advice.  The Directive stipulates, for example, that 
effective legal assistance requires the suspect to have her lawyer present during, 
as well as prior to, police questioning, removing the ambiguity claimed by some 
states post-Salduz.  But framed as they are in the Directive, these norms cannot 
control for other factors that impact on the effectiveness of legal assistance such 
as the size of the criminal bar or the kinds of training that should be provided to 
lawyers.47  Neither do they mandate suspects or lawyers to behave in particular 
ways: the success of these safeguards will always depend to an extent on the 
arrangements in place and the good faith of national states in interpreting and 
                                                        
46 See Dayanan v. Turkey 7377/03, 13 Oct 2009 for an account of the kinds of 
work that the Court anticipated defence lawyers might embark upon as part of 
their custodial legal advice role.  
47 In addition to having suitably trained and qualified lawyers available to 
provide legal advice, the right to a lawyer during police detention is unlikely to 
be effective without adequate provision for legal aid.  Although the Directive on 
legal assistance referred only to national arrangements, a subsequent measure 
has set down minimum thresholds for making legal aid available to criminal 
suspects: Directive on legal aid for suspects and accused persons in criminal 
proceedings and for requested persons in European arrest warrant proceedings 
(EU) 2016/1919.  There is a degree of interdependency between the Roadmap 
Directives, providing for translation and interpretation and that basic offence-
related information is provided to the lawyer at the police station.  The Legal Aid 
Directive (Art. 7) indicates that adequate training should be provided for legal 
aid lawyers. 
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applying measures.48  Article 3 of the Directive stipulates that states should 
provide suspects with access to a lawyer “in such a time and such a manner so as 
to allow the person concerned to exercise their rights of defence practically and 
effectively.”  It might be argued that the assistance of a specialist in family law, 
rather than criminal law, does not meet this threshold.  The control exercised by 
the police may also undermine this right.  Officers may delay the lawyer’s 
presence in serious cases and even in ordinary offences, with the agreement of 
the procureur, they may begin questioning without giving the lawyer time to 
travel to the station.  The two-hour delay to allow the lawyer time to arrive is 
generally respected for the first interrogation, but is less strictly adhered to for 
subsequent interviews.49 However, the inclusion of greater levels of detail and 
more prescriptive standards would in all likelihood be a bar to all states agreeing 
to the measure. 
 
The role of the lawyer is set out in proactive terms: the suspect’s lawyer should 
be present during police questioning and be able to “participate effectively”.  
However, “participation shall be in accordance with procedures under national 
law, provided that such procedures do not prejudice the effective exercise and 
essence of the right concerned.”  This gives some latitude to accommodate 
national procedures, provided that they do not undercut the effectiveness of the 
right.  This ambiguity has resulted in a narrow interpretation in France, however, 
where the lawyer may be present during the suspect’s interrogation, but she may 
not speak, pose questions or clarifications or interrupt; she must remain passive 
throughout, permitted only to make observations at the close of the interview.50 
Again this demonstrates the limits of what the EU can or is prepared to enact in 
terms of mandating standards across different legal systems.  The Directive 
achieves more than the broad principles to be found in ECtHR decisions, but 
comparative research suggests that gaps remain, limiting the extent to which the 
measure is likely to achieve transnational best practice in a way that is 
consistent across jurisdictions. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Transnational norms that seek to ensure that all suspects are provided with the 
opportunity to benefit from custodial legal advice must anticipate the ways in 
which police and lawyers might serve, consciously or otherwise, to undermine 
the effectiveness of this right in practice.  This means taking account of 
procedural differences and the variety of legal personnel carrying out the 
functions of investigation, prosecution, defence and trial, but also of the web of 
                                                        
48 States themselves may also undermine the impact of custodial legal advice by 
weakening other safeguards.  In England and Wales, the presence of lawyers at 
the police station was then used to justify the attenuation of the right to silence; 
in Scotland, the extension of the time a suspect could be detained in police 
custody. 
49 P. Degoul, L’intervention de l’avocat en garde à vue (2018). 
50 Recital 25 specifies that the lawyer should be able to ask questions, seek 
clarifications and make statements, but only “in accordance with national law”. 
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cultures and practices that characterise a criminal justice process.  The size and 
status of the criminal bar, the ways in which investigative supervision operates 
in practice, the availability of legal aid, and the importance that lawyers attach to 
the early stages of the police investigation, all differ across jurisdictions and will 
determine how transnational norms around custodial legal advice are likely to 
play out in practice and be experienced by suspects.  This is not something that 
the ECtHR can do through its decisions, but EU instruments offer the potential to 
draw on these kinds of insights, provided there is an adequate evidence base to 
inform the development of these legal norms.  Research that is comparative, but 
also empirical and socio-legal, can provide the kinds of understanding of 
practices and cultures needed to ensure that transnational norms are 
appropriate and effective.  It can do this by anticipating where weaknesses might 
lie – in the availability of sufficient lawyers with appropriate expertise; in public 
funding; in avoiding suspects’ rights by treating matters as non-criminal; or 
ensuring that suspects are informed of their rights in a way that enables them to 
exercise them.  If measures are shaped with this in mind, they are more likely to 
be implemented in ways that ensure, rather than undercut, their effectiveness.  
The impact of comparative research will depend in part on the subject matter of 
the norms being developed and those who will be putting it into practice – 
changing the expectations of powerful players such as police officers can be 
especially challenging.  Training programmes that support officers in their role 
and make clear the importance and the benefits of procedural safeguards are one 
way of bridging the gap between legal rules and legal practice. 
 
However, research alone cannot ensure the effectiveness of transnational 
criminal procedural norms, unless there is the political will to bring this about.  
The state’s criminal law powers go the heart of its sovereignty and any 
limitations or conditions attached to the exercise of this power will always be a 
matter of sensitivity.  In developing detailed and prescriptive legal norms that 
provide states with confidence in one another’s processes of criminal justice, the 
EU has balanced the need to strengthen the broad principles established by the 
ECtHR, with measures that are sufficiently flexible to allow states to embed them 
within their own legal culture.  In this way, the balance between standards that 
are broad and open-textured, or detailed and prescriptive, is also a balance 
between the universal and the local, the transnational and the national. 
